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Abstract. At FSE 2017, Gaži et al. demonstrated a pseudorandom function (PRF)
distinguisher (Gaži et al., ToSC 2016(2)) on PMAC with Ω(`q2/2n) advantage, where
q, `, and n, denote the number of queries, maximum permissible query length (in terms
of n-bit blocks), and block size of the underlying block cipher. This, in combination
with the upper bounds of O(`q2/2n) (Minematsu and Matsushima, FSE 2007) and
O(qσ/2n) (Nandi and Mandal, J. Mathematical Cryptology 2008(2)), resolved the
long-standing problem of exact security of PMAC. Gaži et al. also showed that the
dependency on ` can be dropped (i.e. O(q2/2n) bound up to ` ≤ 2n/2) for a simplified
version of PMAC, called sPMAC, by replacing the Gray code-based masking in PMAC
with any 4-wise independent universal hash-based masking. Recently, Naito proposed
another variant of PMAC with two powering-up maskings (Naito, ToSC 2019(2))
that achieves `-free bound of O(q2/2n), provided ` ≤ 2n/2. In this work, we first
identify a flaw in the analysis of Naito’s PMAC variant that invalidates the security
proof. Apparently, the flaw is not easy to fix under the existing proof setup. We
then formulate an equivalent problem which must be solved in order to achieve `-free
security bounds for this variant. Second, we show that sPMAC achieves O(q2/2n)
bound for a weaker notion of universality as compared to the earlier condition of
4-wise independence. Third, we analyze the security of PMAC1 (a popular variant of
PMAC) with a simple modification in the linear combination of block cipher outputs.
We show that this simple modification of PMAC1 has tight security O(q2/2n) provided
` ≤ 2n/4. Even if ` > 2n/4, we still achieve same tight bound as long as total number
of blocks in all queries is less than 22n/3.
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1 Introduction
Message Authentication Codes or MACs are symmetric-key primitives that ensure
data integrity and authenticity. PMAC, by Black and Rogaway [BR02], is an example of
parallelizable block cipher-based MAC. A slightly simplified version1 of PMAC based on
an n-bit block cipher EK is defined as follows:
PMACK(m) := EK (EK(m1 ⊕ γ1 ·∆)⊕ · · · ⊕ EK(m`−1 ⊕ γ`−1 ·∆)⊕m`) ,
where (m1, . . . ,m`) is n-bit (also referred as block) parsing of the input message m,
(γ1, · · · , γ`−1) is the gray code sequence [Gra53, Rog04] and ∆ = EK(0n) is the masking
1Ignoring the padding rule.
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key. PMAC and its close variant PMAC1 [Rog04] have the ability to significantly outper-
form sequential block cipher based-MACs, like the CBC-MAC family [EMST76, BKR94,
BdBB+95, BR00], by virtue of their parallelizable nature.
Existing Analysis of PMAC: In the following discussion, q, ` and σ, respectively, denote
the number of queries, maximum permissible message length in blocks, and total number
of blocks in all queries, i.e, σ ≤ `q. It is a well-known observation [GGM84, BGM04]
that a good PRF is necessarily a good deterministic2 MAC. Consequently, most of the
research on the security of PMAC have explored its pseudorandomness properties. The
first result along this line came in the introductory paper by Black and Rogaway [BR02]
who showed an upper bound of O(σ2/2n) on the PRF advantage. A different bound of the
form O(`q2/2n) was shown by Minematsu and Matsushima [MM07]. This bound is better
than the original bound whenever message lengths do not vary much from `. However,
this bound can be worse when very few messages are of length ` and rest of the messages
are of length much smaller than `. Nandi and Mandal [NM08] showed an improved bound
about O(qσ/2n). This is indeed an improved bound for all choices of parameters.
Luykx et al. [LPSY16] studied the problem from lower bound perspective. Specifically,
they constructed a pair of messages such that the PMAC outputs corresponding to the
two messages collide with probability roughly `/2n, leading to a distinguishing attack with
advantage `/2n for q = 2 queries. However, they did not show how this can be extended
to get collision probability about `q2/2n for q ≥ 2 messages. Later Gaži et al. [GPR16]
constructed an adversary which makes q queries, each of length exactly ` blocks, so that
the collision probability of PMAC outputs is about `q2/2n. Thus, the bounds `q2/2n and
qσ/2n are essentially tight. However, it is worth noting that the attack does not work for
PMAC1 [Rog04] where the Gray code sequence is replaced with the sequence α, α2, α3, . . .
for some fixed primitive element α of the Galois field GF(2n). So, the exact security of
PMAC1 is still an open problem.
PRFs with Length Independent Security: In applications where we process large
messages or where most of the messages are of lengths much smaller than `, a bound of
the form O(q2/2n) (length-independent) is much desired, as compared to say a bound of
O(`q2/2n). For instance, AES128 [NIS01] based PMAC needs rekeying after roughly 222
messages when message length can be as large as 256 bytes and more than 2−32 advantage
is not tolerated. On the other hand, any construction with q2/2n or similar bound can be
safely used without rekeying for up to 248 messages in a similar setup. As a result, this
line of research has seen a lot of interest over the years.
EMAC [BKR94, BdBB+95], ECBC and FCBC [BR00] are shown to have O(q2/2n) PRF
advantage provided ` ≤ 2n/4 [JN16a, JN16b]. However, these constructions are sequential
in nature. Luykx et al. [LPTY16] proposed a parallel construction, called LightMAC, that
achieves `-free security. However, inspired by Bernstein’s protected counter sums [Ber99],
LightMAC uses a counter-based encoding which limits the efficiency. For example, to allow
a message length of 2n/2 blocks, LightMAC requires two calls of block ciphers to process one
block of message, i.e., it is a rate3 1/2 construction. Dutta et al. [DJN17] proposed some
optimal strategies to encode counter and message in input blocks. Although this increases
the rate for smaller messages, still the rate is low as compared to PMAC or PMAC1.
With respect to PMAC-like designs, Gaži et al. [GPR16] proved O(q2/2n) bound for a
simplified variant of PMAC, called sPMAC, albeit with comparatively expansive masking
methods. For example, the masking function should be a 4-wise independent function.
Most efficient algebraic instantiations of such a function require at least four keys and
several field multiplications. Very recently, Naito [Nai19] proposed a variant of PMAC1,
2This observation is not true, in general, for nonce-based or probabilistic MACs.
3Roughly speaking, rate is the ratio of message length in blocks to the number of block cipher calls
required to process the message.
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which uses two powering-up maskings (instead of one used in PMAC1). He showed O(q2/2n)
advantage provided ` ≤ 2n/2.
The constructions following Double-block Hash-then-Sum paradigm [DDNP18], in-
cluding PMAC_Plus [Yas11] and LightMAC_Plus [Nai17], achieve beyond the birthday
bound (BBB) security [KLL20] and hence can achieve `-free bound for a wide range of `.
However, these constructions require almost twice the memory (due to the BBB security
requirement) used in other PMAC variants. So, in this paper we only focus on PMAC-like
designs that follow the Hash-then-PRP paradigm [Sho04].
1.1 Our Contributions
Table 1: A comparative summary of several PMAC variants. Here q denotes the number of
queries, ` denotes the upper bound on query-length, and σ denotes the upper bound on total
number of blocks present in all queries.
Mode Security bound Length restriction Number of masking keys
PMAC [BR02] q2`/2n - 1
PMAC1 [Rog04] q2`/2n - 1
NPMAC1 [Nai19] q2/2n ` < 2n/2 2
PMAC3 [Nai20] q2/2n ` < 2n/2 3
PMAC2 [Section 7] q/2
n/2 ` ≤ 2n/4 1
σ1.5/2n 2n/4 < ` ≤ 2n−2 1
1 The security analysis of this construction is shown to be incorrect in this paper.
Our contributions are threefold:
1. Revisiting Naito’s variant of PMAC1: As of now, Naito’s PMAC1 variant
[Nai19], sometimes also referred as NPMAC in this paper, is the only known rate-1
PMAC-like construction that achieves `-free security bound (for ` < 2n/2). We show
that the security analysis of this construction is incorrect (see Section 4). Further,
we state an equivalent problem which must be solved to prove the `-free security of
this construction. However, we are not able to solve that equivalent problem. So
the exact security of Naito’s variant is still an open problem. Naito subsequently
updated the construction [Nai20] in light of our observations. This updated variant
achieves `-free security for ` < 2n/2 (see Section 5).
2. Relaxing the Security Precondition for sPMAC: In [GPR16], sPMAC is
shown to have `-free security bound up to ` < 2n/2 when the underlying masking
function is 4-wise independent hash. We relax the 4-wise independence condition to
2-wise almost XOR universality (see Section 5).
3. PMAC2 – A simple variant of PMAC1: As we still lack of an `-free secure PMAC
variant with efficient masking function, our next part is aimed to solve this problem.
We propose a simple variant of PMAC1, called PMAC2, and we show almost tight
security O(q/2n/2) (see Table 1). More precisely, we prove the following theorem (in
Section 7).
Security Analysis of PMAC2: Let ` denote the number of blocks present in the
longest query and σ denotes the total number of blocks present in q queries altogether.
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Then,
AdvprfPMAC2(q, `, σ) ≤
2q2 + σ
2n + µ
where µ ≤ q2n/2 if ` ≤ 2
n/4 and µ ≤ σ1.52n if 2n/4 < ` ≤ 2n−2.
2 Preliminaries
Basic Notations: For any positive integer n, we write [n] := {1, . . . , n}. We write xq to
denote a q-tuple (x1, . . . , xq). We write X ←$X to represent that X is a uniform random
variable taking values from a finite nonempty set X .
Throughout, ρD ←$ FuncD denotes a random function, and π ←$ Perm denotes a random
permutation. We simply write the random function as ρ, when D is understood from the
context.
Notations on Blocks: Throughout the paper n denotes the security parameter as well
as the bit size of the underlying permutation. We call the set B := {0, 1}n block set and
elements of the set blocks. We define B+ = ∪i≥1Bi. For any binary string m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
we denote the number of bits of m as |m| and we write ‖m‖ := d|m|/ne.4 We use “‖”
to denote concatenation operations on bit strings. For a message m ∈ {0, 1}nl, we write
m = m[1]‖ · · · ‖m[l] with m[i] ∈ {0, 1}n for all i ∈ [l].
Notations on Block Functions and Permutations: We call a function block
function if the range of the function is the block set. The set of all block functions defined
over a set D is denoted as FuncD. The set of all permutations over the block set (also
called block permutation) is denoted as Perm.
A keyed block function F with key space K and domain D is a block function over
K ×D. We also view it as an indexed family of functions, where K is the index set, i.e.,
for each K ∈ K, we associate a function FK(·) := F (K, ·).
Multiset: Informally, a multiset X is a variant of set in which we allow elements to repeat.
One can equivalently define a multiset X by a set {(x,m) : x ∈ X , x appears m times in X}.
We write X o to denote the set of all elements x which appears odd times in X . Note that,
X o by definition is a set which can be empty. We say X is evenly repeated if X o = ∅.
Example 1. Let X := {a, b, a, b, b, c} be a multiset. We represent it by the follow-
ing set {(a, 2), (b, 3), (c, 1)}. Note that X o = {b, c}. Similarly, for a multiset Y :=
{a, b, a, b, b, b, c, c}, Yo = ∅ and hence Y is evenly repeated.
Given a block function π, we use shorthand notation π⊕(X ) :=
⊕
x∈X π(x). With this
notation, it is easy to see that (the empty sum represents 0n)
π⊕(X ) = π⊕(X o) for every multiset X , (1)
and hence π⊕(X ) = 0n whenever X is evenly repeated multiset.
Binary Field: In this paper, we view the block set B as the Galois field GF(2n). We
fix a primitive polynomial p(x) := p0 ⊕ p1x ⊕ · · · ⊕ pnxn where pi ∈ {0, 1}. Note that
p0 = pn = 1 (as it is a primitive polynomial). The field multiplication “·” between two
field elements is defined through the primitive polynomial. We abuse the notation 2 to
denote a primitive element of the underlying field GF(2n).




In the following, let H be a keyed block function with keyspace K and domain D.
Collision Probability: For distinct m,m′ ∈ D, we define collision probability as
collH(m,m′) := Pr(H(K,m) = H(K,m′) : K ←$K).





We generalize the above definition for more than two inputs. For q distinct inputs
m1, . . . ,mq ∈ D, we write
collH(mq) := Pr(∃i < j,H(K,mi) = H(K,mj) : K ←$K), and











Definition 1 (Universal hash function). The keyed block functionH is called an ε-universal
hash if for all distinct m,m′ ∈ D, collH(m,m′) ≤ ε.
Definition 2 (XOR universal hash function). The keyed block function H is called an
ε-almost XOR universal hash if for all distinct m,m′ ∈ D and δ ∈ B,
Pr(H(K,m)⊕H(K,m′) = δ : K ←$K) ≤ ε.
Definition 3 (k-wise independent hash function). The keyed block function H is called a
k-wise independent if for all distinct m1, . . . ,mk ∈ D and for all y1, . . . , yk ∈ B,
Pr(H(K,m1) = y1, . . . ,H(K,mk) = yk : K ←$K) =
1
2kn .
The following observations are easy to establish.
1. A random function is k-wise independent for any k.
2. A 2-wise independent hash function is 2−n-AXU.
2.2 Pseudorandom Functions and the Hash-then-RP Paradigm
Definition 4 (Pseudorandom function). Let F be a keyed block function over a finite set
D with a finite key space K. The PRF-advantage of any oracle adversary A against F is
defined as
AdvprfF (A) :=
∣∣Pr(AFK = 1 : K ←$K)− Pr(AρD = 1)∣∣ .
The maximum PRF-advantage of F is defined as
AdvprfF (q, `, σ) = maxA Adv
prf
F (A),
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A making at most q queries, each of
length at most `, and the total length of all queries at most σ, i.e., σ ≤ `q.
Hash-then-RP Construction: Let H : K × D → B be a keyed hash and π be
an n-bit random permutation. The composition π ◦ HK is called the Hash-then-RP
construction, where K ←$K. When π is replaced with ρ, the resulting composition is
called the Hash-then-RF. These constructions have been studied in [CW79, Sho96]. Many
PRF constructions can be viewed as instances of Hash-then-RP/RF. For example, EMAC
[BKR94, BdBB+95], ECBC, FCBC [BR00], LightMAC [LPTY16] and protected counter
sum [Ber99]. Proposition 1 gives the PRF advantage for Hash-then-RP construction.
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Figure 2.1: The Hash-then-RP paradigm.
Proposition 1. Let H be a keyed block function with keyspace K and domain D. Then,
we have
Advprfπ◦H(q, `, σ) ≤ collH(q, `, σ) +
q(q − 1)
2n+1 .
So, if H is an ε-universal hash function, then







We skip a formal proof here as Proposition 1 is a well-known result. The readers are
referred to [GPR16] for a formal proof.
3 Revisiting Simplified PMAC
Description of sPMAC: Gaži et al. [GPR16] proposed a generalized version of PMAC,
called sPMAC, to capture the underlying masking function for a wide class of PMAC
variants. In what follows N denotes the set of all natural numbers.
π π . . . π
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
m[1] m[2] m[l − 1]
τ(1) τ(2) τ(l − 1)
m[l]
⊕ ⊕. . . ⊕ π′ t
Figure 3.1: The simplified PMAC construction.
Definition 5 (sPHash). For any permutation π ∈ Perm and a block-valued function
τ ∈ FuncN (referred as masking function), we define the simplified PMAC hash or sPHash
over the message space B+ as follows:
for all m := (m[1], . . . ,m[l]) ∈ Bl,
sPHashπ,τ (m) := m[l]⊕
l−1⊕
i=1
π(xτ (m, i)), where xτ (m, a) := m[a]⊕ τ(a). (2)
Clearly, sPHash is just an identity function for a single block message.
Now, given two permutations π, π′ ∈ Perm and a masking function τ ∈ FuncN, the
simplified PMAC or sPMAC construction (illustrated in Figure 3.1) is defined as follows:
for all m ∈ B+,
sPMACπ′,π,τ (m) := π′ (sPHashπ,τ (m)) .
We call K := (π′, π, τ) the key of sPMAC. A concrete variant of PMAC is determined
whenever we fix a sampling mechanism of the key K.
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sPMAC over arbitrary-length messages: For m ∈ {0, 1}∗, we define
m := m[1], . . . ,m[l] n← m
to be the function that partitions m into l = |m‖10
i|
n blocks of size n bits, where i is the
smallest non-negative integer such that |m‖10i| divisible by n. Note that, we make the
required concatenation even if |m| is divisible by n. sPMAC can be easily extended for any
arbitrary-length message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, as sPMAC(m) := sPMAC(m). As the padding rule
is injective, there is no loss of generality in ignoring the padding and assuming all message
sizes are multiple of n.
PMAC variants from sPMAC: Now, we describe some variants of PMAC as instantiations
of sPMAC by defining the sampling mechanism of the key K = (π,π ′, τ ).
1. PMAC: We get the original PMAC [BR02] construction by setting π ←$ Perm, π ′ =
π, and τ (i) = γi · π(0), where γi is the ith element of the Gray code sequence
[Gra53, Rog04].
2. PMAC1: We get PMAC1 [Rog04] by setting π ←$ Perm, π ′ = π, and τ (i) = 2i · π(0),
where 2 is a fixed primitive element of the Galois field GF(2n).
3. Gaži et al.’s variants: In [GPR16], Gaži et al. discussed two variants of PMAC. In
both of the cases, π,π ′←$ Perm and τ is sampled independent of π,π ′. The two
choices of τ are the following:
(a) τ is a uniform random function.
(b) τ is a 4-wise independent hash function.
4. Naito’s variant of PMAC1: Naito proposed another variant of PMAC by setting
π,π ′←$ Perm, and τ (i) = 2i · L1 ⊕ 23i · L2 where L1, L2←$ B. In rest of the paper,
we call this construction NPMAC.
N.B. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we pad all the messages (including the
one whose length is a multiple of n). In the original PMAC(1), the last message block
is padded only when it is incomplete (not a multiple of n) and is processed in a slightly
different manner. However, our analyses are directly applicable to the actual PMAC(1)
constructions.
Upper Bound on the PRF Advantage of sPMAC: Any instance of sPMAC can be
viewed as an instance of Hash-then-RP, as long as π and π ′ are sampled independently.
Thus, the result of Hash-then-RP is not applicable for PMAC and PMAC1 as π ′ = π.
In this paper, we consider only those instances of sPMAC that follow the Hash-then-RP
paradigm where π,π ′, τ are all sampled independently. Moreover, π and π ′ are random
permutations and hence any PMAC variant (and its underlying hash) are completely
determined once we fix a distribution for the masking function τ , say τ . We write sPHashτ
to represent sPHashπ,τ and we write sPMACτ (m) := π ′(sPHashτ (m)). We can restate
Proposition 1 in context of PMAC variants as follows.
AdvprfsPMACτ (q, `, σ) ≤ collsPHashτ (q, `, σ) +
q(q − 1)
2n+1 (3)
≤ q(q − 1)2 · collsPHashτ (`) +
q(q − 1)
2n+1 (4)
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Lower Bound on the PRF Advantage of sPMAC: Fix q distinct messagesm1, . . . ,mq
such that
collsPHashτ (q, `, σ) = collsPHashτ (m1, . . . ,mq).
In other words, the message tuple maximizes the collision probability. Now, we define a
(non-adaptive) PRF distinguisher A for sPMAC that exploits collisions in sPMAC outputs.
1. A makes 2q queries, namely m1,m1‖0n, . . . ,mq,mq‖0n to its oracle O (which is
either sPMACτ , i.e. the real oracle, or a random function, ρ, i.e. the ideal oracle).
2. A returns 1, if for some i 6= j, O(mi) = O(mj) as well as O(mi‖0n) = O(mj‖0n),
and 0 otherwise.
Note that, in case of real oracle, collision for mi and mj implies collision for mi‖0n and




AdvprfsPMACτ (A) ≥ collsPHashτ (m1, . . . ,mq)−
q(q − 1)
22n+1 .
≥ collsPHashτ (q, `, σ)−
q(q − 1)
22n+1 . (5)












∣∣∣AdvprfsPMACτ (A)− collsPHashτ (q, `, σ)∣∣∣ ≤ q(q − 1)2n+1 .
3.1 Collision Analysis of sPMAC [GPR16]
We fix two distinct messages m := (m[1], . . . ,m[l]),m′ := (m′[1], . . . ,m′[l′]) with number
of blocks l := lm and l′ := lm′ respectively. We also assume l ≤ l′. Let mchop :=
(m[1], . . . ,m[l − 1]) denote the message m after removing the last block. Similarly, we
write m′chop for the message m′. Let
V := {(M,a) | M ∈ {m,m′}; 1 ≤ a ≤ lM − 1}
be called index set. For any masking function τ , recall the definition of xτ (also referred
as input function) from Eq. (2). xτ can be viewed as a block function defined over V . For
a masking function τ , we write the multiset corresponding to all inputs for the chopped
message mchop as
Xτ (mchop) := {xτ (m, 1), xτ (m, 2), . . . , xτ (m, l − 1)}.
We similarly define Xτ (m′chop) for the message m′ and Xτ (mchop,m′chop) := Xτ (mchop) ∪
Xτ (m′chop). Note that Xτ (mchop,m′chop) actually depends on mchop and m′chop.
Definition 6 (cross-canceling masking function). A masking function τ is called cross-
canceling with respect to mchop and m′chop if Xτ (mchop,m′chop) is evenly repeated. Let
θτ (mchop,m′chop) := Prτ (τ is cross-canceling with respect to (mchop,m′chop)),
and θτ (`) := max θτ (mchop,m′chop), where the maximum is taken over all distinctmchop,m′chop
with l, l′ < `. θτ (`) is referred as the cross-cancellation probability of τ .
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A proof of the following lemma is available in [GPR16, Lemma 2]. Similar result is also
proved in [LPSY16, Proposition 1], albeit under a slightly different notational setup. We
give another proof here for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 1 ([GPR16]). For any random masking τ , we have
collsPHashτ (`) ≤ θτ (`) +
1
2n − 2` .
Proof. Letm,m′ be two distinct messages with |m|, |m|′ ≤ `. Now, the event sPHashτ (m) =
sPHashτ (m′) can be divided in the following two disjoint events:
• A : sPHashτ (m) = sPHashτ (m′) ∧ τ is cross-canceling with respect to (mchop,m′chop)
• B : sPHashτ (m) = sPHashτ (m′) ∧ τ is not cross-canceling with respect to (mchop,m′chop)
The probability of event A can be bounded by θτ (mchop,m′chop). Let us look at the event
B. For simplicity of notation let us denote the multiset Xτ (mchop,m′chop) by X . Then
from Eq. (1) we have
⊕
x∈Xo
π(x) = m[l]⊕m[l′]. Since X o 6= ∅, we can choose some x1 ∈ X o
and bound Pr[B] as follows:
Pr[B] ≤ Prπ
[
π(x1) = ⊕x 6=x1π(x)⊕m[l]⊕m′[l′]
]
≤ 12n − l − l′ ≤
1
2n − 2` (7)
In the first inequality we are considering x-values only from X o. The second inequality
follows from probability of π(x1) after we sample all other π-values in a without replacement
manner. Since we are left with exactly one choice among at least 2n − l − l′ many values
here, we get the bound. The third inequality is obvious.
Therefore,
collsPHashτ (m,m′) ≤ θτ (m,m′) +
1
2n − 2` .
We get the required result by taking maximum over all m,m′ such that m 6= m′ and
|m|, |m′| ≤ ` in both sides of the above inequality.
Extension of Cross-Cancellation Probability over q Messages. In [GPR16],
the idea of cross-cancellation is defined for two messages. Here, we extend the idea to more
than two messages. For the sake of simplicity of notation we will write θτ (m,m′) (and τ is
cross-canceling with respect to m,m′) instead of θτ (mchop,m′chop) (and τ is cross-canceling
with respect to mchop,m′chop). We say τ to be cross-canceling with respect to mq if τ is
cross-canceling with respect to mi,mj for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q. Let
θτ (mq) := Prτ (τ is cross-canceling with respect to mq),
and θτ (q, `, σ) := max θτ (mq), where the maximum is taken over all q distinct messages
each with at most `− 1 blocks, having at most σ − q blocks altogether.
Lemma 2. For any random masking τ , we have
θτ (q, `, σ) ≤ collsPHashτ (q, `, σ) ≤ θτ (q, `, σ) +
q(q − 1)
2(2n − 2`) .
Proof. Suppose, m1, . . . ,mq are q messages for which θτ (mq) = θτ (q, `, σ). Let T denote
the set of all realizable masking functions. Let Ti,j ⊆ T denote the set of all cross-canceling
masking functions with respect to (mi,mj). Then, θτ (mq) := Pr(τ ∈ ∪i<jTi,j). Let
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m′i = mi‖0n for 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Now, for any τ ∈ Ti,j , sPHashτ (m′i) = sPHashτ (m′j) holds (also
denoted as colli,j). So,
θτ (q, `, σ) = Pr(τ ∈ ∪i<jTi,j) ≤ Pr(∪i<jcolli,j) ≤ collsPHashτ (q, `, σ).
Now, we show the upper bound. We fix q distinct messages m1, . . . ,mq such that
collsPHashτ (mq) = collsPHashτ (q, `, σ). Let µ := Pr(τ is cross-canceling with respect to mq).
collsPHashτ (mq) ≤ µ+
∑
τ∈T \∪i<jTi,j




Pr(∃i < j,π⊕(X oτ (mi,mj)) = mi[li]⊕mj [lj ])× Pr(τ = τ)
≤ Pr(τ is cross-canceling with respect to mq) + q(q − 1)2(2n − 2`) ,
where the last inequality is obtained by conditioning on the output of π on all elements in
X oτ (mi,mj) except one. Note that this is possible only because X oτ (mi,mj) 6= ∅ since τ is
not a cross-canceling function.
Corollary 1. For any random masking function τ , we have




sPMACτ (q, `, σ) ≤ θτ (q, `, σ) +
q(q − 1)
2(2n − 2`) +
q(q − 1)
2n+1
≤ q(q − 1)2 · θτ (`) +
q(q − 1)
2(2n − 2`) +
q(q − 1)
2n+1 .
Corollary 1 follows from Eq. (3) and Lemma 2 in combination with the observation that






To achieve O(q2/2n) bound, it is sufficient to show θτ (`) ≤ c/2n for some constant c
(should be independent of `). Sometimes, it is possible to show this for a range of values
of ` instead of all values of `. Sometimes, it might be difficult to obtain `-free bound for
θτ (`). However, it might be possible to show `-free bound for the θτ (q, `, σ) by considering
all q messages together. In this case, first part of the above corollary could be used to










Some Examples of Cross-Cancellation Probability: We list some known results
on the cross-cancellation probability of some masking functions.
1. In [GPR16], Gaži et al. show the following bounds on cross-cancellation probability:
(a) If τ is a uniform random function, then θτ (`) ≤ 21−n.
(b) If τ is a 4-wise independent hash function, then θτ (`) ≤ 22−n.
2. For the masking function τ (i) = 2i · Li ⊕ 23i · L2, Naito proved the following result
[Nai19, Section 4.2: Bounding p2coll] whenever L1, L2←$ B:
θτ (`) ≤ 22−n, while ` ≤ 2n/2. (9)
4 An Observation on Naito’s PMAC Variant
In this section, we revisit a claim of [Nai19] regarding the cross cancellation probability of
two powering-up maskings.
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4.1 A Flaw and Its Effect on the Proof of NPMAC [Nai19]
As mentioned in section 3, Naito proved Eq. (9) with respect to the cross cancellation
probability of two powering-up maskings. The proof relies on five cases [Nai19, Section 4.2:
Type-1 to Type-5]. The most crucial and general of these cases is Type-5. Naito made the
following claim with respect to this case.
Claim in [Nai19, Type-5 case in Section 4.2]: The following system of equations, denoted
(E), in L1 and L2 such that {i1, i2} 6= {i3, i4},
(2i1 ⊕ 2i2)L1 ⊕ (23i1 ⊕ 23i2)L2 = c1
(2i3 ⊕ 2i4)L1 ⊕ (23i3 ⊕ 23i4)L2 = c2
has rank two (i.e. the equations are always linearly independent).
The author argues as follows: If the equations are not linearly independent then 2i1 ⊕2i2 =
2i3⊕2i4 and 23i1⊕23i2 = 23i3⊕23i4 . From this, by using simple calculation, one can obtain
i1 = i2 = i3 = i4. This leads to a contradiction of the assumption that {i1, i2} 6= {i3, i4},
and hence the linear dependence assumption is false. The author thus concludes that the
system (E) will always have rank 2. In other words, for fixed i1, i2, i3, i4, the system has a
unique solution for the pair (L1, L2).
Flaw in the Argument: Unfortunately, linear dependency and consistency of the two
equations over GF(2n) can be equivalently written as
2i1 ⊕ 2i2 = c · (2i3 ⊕ 2i4) (10)
23i1 ⊕ 23i2 = c · (23i3 ⊕ 23i4) (11)
where c2 = c · c1. Clearly, whenever c 6= 1, the claim on (E) is not correct. In [Nai19], the
author only considers the c = 1 case. Next, we show a concrete counterexample for this.
Counterexample for the Rank Claim: First, we can rewrite Eq. (10) and (11) as
(2i1 ⊕ 2i2) · (23i3 ⊕ 23i4) = (2i3 ⊕ 2i4) · (23i1 ⊕ 23i2) (12)
We show a counterexample for n = 16. Similar examples can be constructed for other
values of n as well. Consider the field GF(216) generated by x = 2 with multiplication
defined by the minimal polynomial x16 + x5 + x3 + x+ 1. Using simple algebra one can
show that i1 = 1, i2 = 24, i3 = 14 and i4 = 18 satisfies Eq. (12). Plugging in the same
values in Eq. (11), one can get
c = 212 ⊕ 29 ⊕ 28 ⊕ 27 ⊕ 26 ⊕ 25 ⊕ 22 ⊕ 2⊕ 1.
This proves that the system (E) can be of rank 1 as well. And, the number of such
i1, i2, i3, i4 is at least 1. Whereas, Naito incorrectly argues that the number of such
quadruples is 0.
Effect on the Current Proof: The system (E) is fixed once we fix the quadruple
(i1, i2, i3, i4). In [Nai19], the number of i1, i2, i3, i4 indices corresponding to the system
(E) is bounded by O(`2) which can be further bounded by O(2n) (since ` ≤ 2n/2). This
bound is fine as long as the rank of system (E) is 2, as this will mean that we get an
overall cross-cancellation probability bound of O(2−n). However, given the evidence that
(E) can have rank 1, a bound of O(`2) is not desirable, as it will result in an overall
cross-cancellation probability bound of O(`2/2n) which is worse than O(`/2n) bound for
the existing PMAC.
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4.2 Further Discussion on the Security of NPMAC
From previous discussions, it is clear that the question of `-free security for NPMAC is
far from resolved. Going by the existing proof strategy [Nai19], we get θτ (`) = O(`2/2n)
bound. Looking ahead momentarily, Proposition 2 shows that we can achieve O(`/2n)
for any O(2−n)-AXU masking function. This result also applies to NPMAC as the two
powering-up maskings is obviously a O(2−n)-AXU. But, this is as far as we could reach.
In what follows, we discuss some bottlenecks in resolving this question one way or another.
Let us denote the number of quadruples satisfying Eq. (12) by N . Our counterexample
in the previous subsection shows that N = Ω(1) and due to Proposition 2 we can give a
trivial upper bound of N = O(`). Now, to prove or disprove the `-free security claim we
need an exact estimate of N .
We could neither construct a counterexample where N = Ω(`), nor show that N = O(1).
This indeed looks like a hard problem requiring an involved analysis of the properties of
GF(2n). Interestingly, a similar hardness remains for PMAC1 as well [LPSY16, GPR16]
that involves a study of the additive subgroups (and their cosets) of GF(2n).
Note that, (E) is a simplified version of the actual system of equation that we
have to analyze. In the actual system, c1 and c2 are not arbitrary. In fact, for some
M1,M2,M3,M4 ∈ {m,m′},




Clearly the simplification, though sufficient to discuss the flaw, could possibly degrade
the bound as we count some inconsistent systems of equations as well. We say that a
quadruple (i1, i2, i3, i4) is valid if the resulting system of equation (E) is consistent. At
the moment, we do not see any approach to exploit the exact nature of c to get a better
estimate for the number of valid quadruples satisfying Eq. (12).
In summary, to prove or disprove the `-free security of NPMAC, we have to bound:
The number, N , of valid quadruples (i1, i2, i3, i4) that satisfy
(2i1 ⊕ 2i2) · (23i3 ⊕ 23i4) = (2i3 ⊕ 2i4) · (23i1 ⊕ 23i2).
We leave it as an open problem to find an exact estimate for N , which in turn gives tight
security bound for NPMAC. In fact, even a sub-optimal bound better than Ω(1) (in case
of lower bound) or O(`) (in case of upper bound), say in the order of a slowly growing
function of `, could be a great improvement.
5 Relaxing the Security Precondition for sPMAC
Gaži et al. [GPR16] showed that a 4-wise independent masking function is sufficient
to achieve `-free security bound up to ` ≤ 2n/2. In this section, we relax the 4-wise
independence condition to a weaker notion. Our relaxed notion of universality is inspired
by the flaw discovered in section 4.
5.1 2-wise Almost XOR Universal Hash Function
We extend the definition of AXU hash functions to jointly consider two pairs of messages
and their hash output differences.
Definition 7 (2-wise AXU). A hash function H is called ε 2-wise AXU (or ε-2AXU) if
for any distinct {m1,m2}, {m3,m4} and δ1, δ2 ∈ B, we have
Pr(H(K,m1)⊕H(K,m2) = δ1 : K ←$K) ≤ ε,
Pr(H(K,m1)⊕H(K,m2) = δ1, H(K,m3)⊕H(K,m4) = δ2 : K ←$K) ≤ ε2.
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Clearly, any ε-2AXU hash function is also an ε-AXU hash function. We usually expect
ε = O(1/2n) and hence the joint probability for the two linear equations is O(1/22n).
Mennink defined a very close variant, called AXU3, in [Men18]. In that definition
m3 = m1 (and hence m2 6= m4). He also gave an example of AXU3 (and its higher order
variants) using finite field arithmetic.
2AXU is Strictly Weaker than 4-wise Independence: It is easy to see that a
4-wise independent hash function is 2−n-2AXU. However, every 2AXU hash function need
not be 4-wise independent. Consider the following example due to Naito [Nai, Nai20].
Similar example can also be found in [Men18] as an example of AXU4 (see [Men18] for
definition) hash function.
Example 2. Let L1, L2, L3←$ B. For a fixed primitive element 2 of GF(2n) and any i,
let us define
τ (i) := 2i · L1 ⊕ 22i · L2 ⊕ 23i · L3.
It can be easily shown that τ is O(2−n)-2AXU. However, for any distinct i1, i2, i3, i4 and
y1, y2, y3, y4 we cannot get probability 1/24n for the following event:
2ij · L1 ⊕ 22ij · L2 ⊕ 23ij · L3 = yj ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
In other words, the above masking function is not 4-wise independent.
Remark 1. The two powering-up maskings used in [Nai19] is not 2−n-2AXU hash. However,
Naito addressed this issue in [Nai20] and proposed an alternate “three powering-up
maskings” which is same as our example 2. He has given a dedicated proof for this
construction whereas our proof for this one follows from our general treatment of 2AXU
hash functions.
5.2 PRF Security of sPMAC
From Corollary 1, we know that the PRF advantage of sPMAC is bounded by the cross-
cancellation probability of the underlying masking function. We have closely revisited
all the existing proof strategies for upper bounding the cross-cancellation probability
and have found a unified way to present all these proofs. This approach also helps in
understanding the requirements from the masking function for achieving length-independent
PRF advantage. We state two results unifying the proofs of existing and some new
constructions. The proofs of these results is postponed to section 6.
Proposition 2. Suppose τ is ε-AXU. Then, θτ (`) ≤ 2`ε. Hence, by using Corollary 1,
we have
AdvprfsPMACτ (q, `, σ) ≤ q
2`ε+ q
2
2(2n − 2`) +
q2
2n+1 .
Proposition 2 gives the security bound for PMAC and PMAC1 when the outer permutation
is replaced by an independent random permutation and the masking key is sampled
independently. A dedicated analysis is required when we consider outer permutation same
as the inner one and the masking key is derived from the permutation, like the original
PMAC and PMAC1.
The bound in Proposition 2 is not `-free as it has q2`ε term (which came due to
cross-cancellation probability). In the following result, we show how we can improve this
term if we apply a stronger masking function. Gaži et al. [GPR16] proved a similar result
for 4-wise independent masking function. However, we can easily extend their result to
the weaker notion of 2AXU masking function.
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Theorem 1. Suppose τ is ε-2AXU. Then, θτ (`) ≤ max{2ε, 4`2ε2}. Hence, by using
Corollary 1, we have
AdvprfsPMACτ (q, `, σ) ≤ max{q
2ε, 2q2`2ε2}+ q
2
2(2n − 2`) +
q2
2n+1 .
So, when ε = 1/2n and ` ≤ 2n−12 then
AdvprfsPMACτ (q, `, σ) ≤
5q2
2n+1 .
Theorem 1 also works (up to ` ≤ 2n/2) for a uniform random masking function and 4-wise
independent masking function as these are also 1/2n-2AXU hash functions. However, in
case of uniform random function, a more precise analysis (as shown in [GPR16]) gives
θρ(`) ≤ 2/2n for all values of `.
Remark 2. Our result is a bit stronger than the result proved in [GPR16] as every 2AXU
hash function need not be 4-wise independent hash function.
Remark 3. Theorem 1 gives an alternate proof of `-free security for Naito’s updated variant
[Nai20] with three powering up masking (see example 2).
6 Proof of Theorem 1
Before we delve into the proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, we describe a graph-based
description of input collisions that would help us to have some visual presentation of
cross-canceling masking function.
6.1 Input Collision Graph and Covering Bound Lemma
Graph Notations: For a set V , let [V ]2 denote the set of all doubleton subsets of V . So,




:= |V |(|V | − 1)/2. A graph G is a pair (V,E) where E ⊆ [V ]2.
We call V and E the vertex and edge set of the graph, respectively. We also denote V (G)
and E(G) to denote the vertex set and edge set of the graph G, respectively. An edge is an
element {u, v} ∈ E and we also say that u is adjacent to v. Given a graph G = (V,E) and
a subset V ′ ⊆ V , the subgraph restricted at V ′, denoted as G(V ′), has vertex set V ′ and
the edge set [V ′]2 ∩ E. A path from u to v of length t is a sequence of distinct elements
(w0 := u,w1, . . . , wt := v) such that wi−1 is adjacent to wi for all i ∈ [t]. A component C
(or connected component) is a subset of V such that for every u, v ∈ C either u = v or
there is a path from u to v. A component C of a graph G is called clique if all pairs of
the components are adjacent. We call a graph G evenly partitioned if all components of G
have even sizes.
Input Collision Graph: Recall the index set V := {(M,a) | M ∈ {m,m′}; 1 ≤ a ≤
lM − 1} for two distinct messages m and m′ of length l = lm and l′ = lm′ , respectively,
such that l ≤ l′. To each masking function τ , we associate a collision graph Gτ with the
vertex set V such that any two vertices (M1, a1) and (M2, a2) are said to be adjacent if
xτ (M1, a1) = xτ (M2, a2). So an input collision graph is always disjoint union of cliques.
A graph G′ over V is called τ -realizable if there is a realizable masking function τ such
that Gτ = G′. Let G be the set of all such realizable graphs. Among all realizable graphs,
we are interested in some special graphs, namely evenly partitioned graph. Let Geven be
the set of all realizable graphs which are evenly partitioned. The following observation is
straightforward from the definition of cross-canceling masking function.
14
Claim 1. A masking function τ is cross-canceling if and only if the induced input collision
graph Gτ is evenly partitioned.
Due to Corollary 1, it is now sufficient to bound the probability to realize any evenly
partitioned graph (equivalent to realizing a cross-canceling masking function). Now, we
identify a subset of vertices for which restricted subgraph over that subset is evenly
partitioned whenever the graph is evenly partitioned. Let
V= := {(M,a) : M ∈ {m,m′}, a ≤ l, l′, m[a] = m′[a]}.
So, (m, a) ∈ V= if and only if (m′, a) ∈ V=. For any such (m, a), we obviously have
xτ (m, a) = xτ (m′, a) for all masking functions τ (not necessarily cross-canceling masking
function). Hence, for any realizable input collision graph Gτ , {(m, a), (m′, a)} is an edge
of the graph and we call those edges vertical (all other edges will be non-vertical). On the
other hand, if (m, a) /∈ V= then (m, a) and (m′, a) are not adjacent whenever these are
defined. Let V 6= := V \ V= and
I 6= := {a : either (m, a) ∈ V 6= or (m′, a) ∈ V 6=}.
We can rewrite the set I 6= as union of the interval [l + 1, l′] (can be the empty set) and
{a : a ≤ l, l′ and m[a] 6= m′[a]}. As m 6= m′, we have V 6= 6= ∅. Given any graph G we
denote G6= := G(V 6=), the subgraph restricted on the set of vertices V 6=.
Now any connected component of Gτ consists of a connected component of G6=τ with
some additional pairs of vertices from V=. Hence, we have the following result.
Claim 2. For all masking functions τ , Gτ is evenly partitioned if and only if G6=τ is evenly
partitioned.
Now, we explain a method by which we can obtain an upper bound on the cross-canceling
probability θτ (`) or θτ (q, `, σ). Let G 6=even be the collection of all evenly partitioned realizable
graphs over the vertex set V 6=. Due to above claim, this is same as the collection of all
restricted subgraphs with vertex set V 6= of all evenly partitioned realizable graphs.
Definition 8 (covering collection of edges). Let I be some index set such that for every
i ∈ I we have an edge set Ei ⊆ [V 6=]2. The collection E := {Ei : i ∈ I} is said to cover
evenly partitioned graphs if for all G ∈ G 6=even, there exists i := iG ∈ I such that Ei ⊆ E(G).
For any edge e := {(M1, a1), (M2, a2)} ∈ [V]2, we say that event e(τ ) holds if
τ (a1)⊕ τ (a2) = ce := M1[a1]⊕M2[a2].
We extend the above definition to an edge set E as follows: An event E(τ ) holds if for all
edges e ∈ E, e(τ ) holds. All these events are defined based on the randomness of τ only
and we simply write Pr(e) or Pr(E) to denote the probability that the corresponding event
holds under the randomness of τ .
Lemma 3 (Covering Bound Lemma). Suppose {Ei : i ∈ I} covers evenly partitioned
graphs, then we have




Proof. Let T ∗ denote the set of all cross-canceling masking functions with respect to (m,m′).
For every Ei, let Ti denote the set of all masking function τ such that Ei ⊆ E(G6=τ ). Now,
we claim that T ∗ ⊆ ∪iTi. For any τ ∈ T ∗, Gτ is an evenly partitioned graph and hence
(using Claim 2) for some i, Ei ⊆ E(G6=τ ) ⊆ E(Gτ ). Thus, τ ∈ Ti. So the claim holds. The
result follows from union bound.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let i be the smallest element in I 6=. We use shorthand notation ei(v) and e′i(v) to
denote edges {(m, i), v} and {(m′, i), v}, respectively, whenever these are defined. Let
V 6=i := V 6= \ {(m, i), (m′, i)}.
As (m′, i) has an edge for any evenly partitioned graph G ∈ G 6=even, there must exist
(M, j) with j > i and M ∈ {m,m′} such that (m′, i) is adjacent to (M, j). So, we define
the following collection of edge sets of size one.
Ei := {Ev := e′i(v) : v ∈ V
6=
i }.
From the above discussion, it is clear that this covers all evenly partitioned graphs. Now,
using the fact that τ is ε-AXU, we have Pr(E(M,j)) = Pr(τ (i)⊕ τ (j) = m′[i]⊕M [j]) ≤ ε
(since j 6= i). So, using the covering bound lemma (Lemma 3) we have




Pr(Ev) ≤ (l + l′)ε.
As l, l′ ≤ `, we have θ(`) ≤ 2`ε. This completes the proof.
6.3 Resuming the Proof of Theorem 1
Here, we first assume that |I 6=| > 2, and we denote the first, second and third smallest
elements of I 6= as i1, i2 and i3, respectively. For 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, V 6=j := V 6= \ {(m, ij), (m′, ij)},
and we use shorthand notation ej(v) and e′j(v) to denote edges {(m, ij), v} and {(m′, ij), v},
respectively, whenever these are edges over V (they may not be edge as some of the vertices
may not be present in V).
In the previous proof for AXU masking function, edge sets are singleton and hence
the probability for any such edge set can be at best O(1/2n) (as we deal with a single
equation). Now, we are considering doubleton edge sets, hoping that probability to realize
any edge set is about O(1/22n) (as we assume stronger masking function), to achieve
better security. Consider the following collections of doubleton edge sets:
1. E1 := {{e′1(M, i2), e′3(v)} : v ∈ V
6=
3 ,M ∈ {m,m′}},




2 , (M2, j2) ∈ V
6=
2 }.
We claim that the collection E := E1 ∪ E2 is a covering collection of edges. Fix any evenly
partitioned graph G over V 6=. The vertex (m′, i1) should be adjacent to some other vertex.
Case 1: Suppose, (m′, i1) is adjacent to (M, i2) then the vertex (m′, i3) should be adjacent
to (M, j) for some j 6= i3. So, we can use an appropriate edge set from E1.
Case 2: Suppose, (m′, i1) is adjacent to (M, j) for some M ∈ {m,m′} and j ≥ i3. Then,
(m′, i2) should be adjacent to (M, j) for some j 6= i2. So, we can use an appropriate
collection from E2.
Thus, E is indeed a covering collection of edges. Now, we fix any edge set E :=
{e′1(M1, i2), e′3(M2, j)} ∈ E1 where j 6= i3. Then, for c1 = m′[i1] ⊕ M1[i2] and c2 =
m′[i3]⊕M2[j], we have
Pr(E) = Pr(τ (i1)⊕ τ (i2) = c1, τ (i3)⊕ τ (j) = c2) ≤ ε2,
where the inequality follows from the definition of ε-2AXU. Similarly, for any edge set E ∈
E2, one can show that Pr(E) ≤ ε2. Note that |E1| ≤ 2(l+l′) and |E2| ≤ (l+l′−2) ·(l+l′−4).
So, |E| ≤ (l + l′)2 ≤ 4`2. By using the covering bound Lemma (Lemma 3), we have





Now, the only remaining case is |I 6=| = 2 (|I 6=| cannot be 1 as this would contradict the
existence of evenly partitioned graph). In this case, we have only two possibilities of evenly
partitioned graphs, each occurring with at most ε probability (using ε-2AXU). So, we have
Prτ (τ is cross-canceling with respect to (m,m′)) ≤ 2ε.
The result follows by combining the two cases for |I 6=|.
7 PMAC2: A Simple Variant of PMAC1
π π . . . ππ
⊕ ⊕ ⊕






. . . π′ t
Figure 7.1: PMAC2: A message m is padded with 10∗ to get m[1]||m[2]|| . . .m[l] where each
m[i] is an n-bit string. L is obtained as π(0) where π ←$ Perm. Here α is a primitive element of
the field GF (2n).
Now we propose a simple variant of PMAC1 which we call PMAC2 (see Fig. 7.1). Given
any message m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ we append a bit 1 followed by a smallest sequence of zeros so that
the padded message has size multiple of n. Let m := (m[1], . . . ,m[l]) ∈ Bl be a padded
message. As it is an injective padding, we define the construction after the padding. Let π
and π ′ be two independent random permutations (for a real construction we use a block
cipher instantiated by two independent keys). We compute the final output of PMAC2(m)
as follows:
PMAC2π,π′(m)
1 : Input: m = m[1]‖ . . . ‖m[l]
2 : L← π(0)
3 : for i = 1 to l − 1, do x[i]← m[i]⊕ αi−1 · L




5 : return π ′(Hπ)
Theorem 2. (Main Theorem: Bound for Hash Collision Probability of PMAC2)






2n/2 if ` ≤ 2
n/4
σ1.5
2n if 2n/4 < ` ≤ 2n−2.
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We prove this theorem in the next subsection. The PRF-advantage of our construction
will follow from hash-then-prp result:
AdvprfPMAC2(q, `, σ) ≤ collH(q, `, σ) +
q2
2n+1 .
Remark 4. The original proof for PMAC works perfectly in the case of PMAC2 and hence
the security of PMAC2 is also bounded by the security bound of PMAC. Our result gives a
different bound of PMAC2 which essentially gives tighter bounds in the cases of ` < 2n/4
and ` ≥ 2n/4 such that ` < q. In all other cases we can take the usual bound for PMAC.
To be precise, we can always choose the minimum between the usual bound for PMAC and
the bound obtained here.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Let mq = (m1, . . . ,mq) be a q-tuple of distinct messages. Let `i = ‖mi‖, ` := maxi `i
and σ :=
∑
i `i. For simplicity we will write H(m) instead of Hπ(m) for any message
m. We want to bound coll(mq) := Prπ ←$ Perm[∃i 6= j, H(mi) = H(mj)]. Note that we
use the masking function τL(i) := αi−1 · L where L = π(0). For every i 6= j, we have
already defined a graph GτL(mi,mj) (defined previously as GτL for any block function τ
and a pair of distinct messages m,m′). Note that, we explicitly associated the graph GτL
with the corresponding message pair (mi,mj) as we are dealing with multiple message
pairs. We will drop this parametrization whenever the message pair is known from the
context. Here, for simplicity, we will denote any vertex by (k, a) instead of (mk, a). GτL is





Definition 9. A masking function τL (or simply L) is cross linear canceling for some
i 6= j, if βC = 0 for every clique C in GL(mi,mj). We define
θ′(mq) := PrL[∃i 6= j, τL is cross linear cancelling for i, j].
Avoiding Zero Input. We first avoid zero block as an input of π since it already appears
to define our masking key L. We define the following event:
bad0 : ∃i, a, xi[a] = 0
Clearly, Pr[bad0] ≤ σ2n as for every (i, a), Pr(xi[a] = 0) = 1/2n.
It is easy to see that if L is cross linear canceling for i, j, then H(mi) = H(mj).
Therefore, a similar statement like Lemma 1 holds:
Lemma 4.
coll(mq) ≤ θ′(mq) + q
2
2(2n − 2`) +
σ
2n
Proof. Let H(mi) = H(mj) for some i < j ∈ [q]. Then one of the following three events
must happen:
• bad0
• A(i, j) : τL is cross linear canceling for i, j ∧ H(mi) = H(mj)
• B(i, j) : τL is not cross linear canceling for i, j, ∧ H(mi) = H(mj) ∧ ¬bad0
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Therefore,
coll(mq) ≤ Pr[∪i<jA(i, j)] + Pr[∪i<jB(i, j)] + Pr[bad0]




since Pr[∪i<jA(i, j)] ≤ θ′(mq) and Pr[bad0] ≤ σ2n .
Let us now consider the event B(i, j). That τL is not cross linear canceling for i, j
implies that there exists a component C1 in the graph GτL(mi,mj) such that βC1 6= 0. For
any component C of the graph, we get a unique value, say x(C) such that xk(a) = x(C)
for any (k, a) ∈ C. Note that for any two distinct components C and C ′, x(C) 6= x(C ′).
Thus
H(mi) = H(mj) ⇐⇒ βC1 · π(x(C1)) =
⊕
C 6=C1
βC · π(x(C))⊕m[`i]⊕m[`j ].
With the assumption ¬bad0, we can bound the probability of B(i, j) using the randomness
of π(x(C1)) (since βC1 6= 0) after we sample π-values for all other components in a without
replacement manner. Since the maximum number of components in GτL(mi,mj) is `i + `j ,
we get
Pr[B(i, j)] ≤ 12n − `i − `j
≤ 12n − 2` (14)
Therefore, applying union bound on ∪i<jB(i, j) we get the required bound for coll(mq)
directly from Eq. (13).
Now, it suffices to bound θ′(mq). For the time being we assume that `i = ` for all i.





Proof. For any i < j, we let ai,j := min I 6=(mi,mj). Consider the following two events:
• bad1 : ∃i ∈ [q],∃b, c ∈ [`− 1], b < c, such that xi[b] = xi[c]
• bad2 : ∃i < j ∈ [q],∃b ∈ [`−1], b 6= ai,j , such that (xi[ai,j ] = xj [b])∨(xi[ai,j ] = xi[b])
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
· · ·
(i, ai,j) (i, c)
(j, b)
· · ·
· · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
(i, ai,j)
(j, b) (j, c)
· · · · · ·
· · ·
· · · · · ·
(i, ai,j) (i, b) (i, c)
· · ·
Figure 7.2: One of these is a necessary subgraph of a cross linear canceling graph for two
messages with same block-lengths. A red or (solid) black line between two nodes signifies equality
between them. Red is used when two blocks with different positions collide. Black is used when
two blocks with same position collide.
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We claim that if L is cross linear canceling for some message pair (mi,mj), then both bad
events bad1 and bad2 hold. We first note that 2n − 1 > ` > 1. Now consider the clique C
of GτL(mi,mj) that contains (i, ai,j). From the definition of βC and the assumption that
`i = `j , we note that βC can be zero only if C contains at least three vertices. Figure 7.2
illustrates all possible types of sub-clique of C, containing exactly three vertices, one of
which is (i, ai,j). It is obvious to see that at least two of the vertices must appear in the
same query, whence we establish that bad1 holds. Further, Figure 7.2 shows all possible
way in which xi[ai,j ] is connected to some vertex, which establishes that bad2 must hold.
This validates our claim. The proof follows from Eq. (15).
Handling Different Length Queries:
Claim 3. If two messages mi and mj are of different length then τ is not cross linear
canceling for i, j.
To show this, suppose τ is cross linear canceling for i, j. Without any loss of generality
assume ‖mi‖ > ‖mj‖. Then each βC must be 0. Thus the sum over all βC where C is a







which can never be 0 since α is a primitive element of GF (2n).
Now, we group together all the messages with same block-lengths. Precisely, for any
l ∈ [`], we define the following notations:
Sl := {i ∈ [q] : ‖mi‖ = l}; sl := |Sl|;
Note that
∑
l sl = q,
∑
l sll = σ.
Moreover, for any l ∈ [`], we define mSl := (mi1 , . . . ,misl ) where {i1, . . . , isl} denotes
the set Sl in ascending order. Therefore,
θ′(mSl) = Pr[∃i 6= j ∈ Sl s.t. L is cross linear cancelling for i, j].




θ′(mSl) ≤ µ :=
∑
l
µl where µl :=
min{sll2, 2s2l l}
2n+1 . (16)
In the remainder, we derive upper bounds on µ depending upon the range of ` values.
First, consider ` ≤ 2n/4. In this case, we have µl ≤ sl2n/2 which implies
µ ≤ q2n/2 . (17)
Now, consider ` > 2n/4. Using the fact that for positive reals a and b,
√














where the second inequality follows from the fact that Σiari ≤ (Σiai)r for positive ai and
r > 1, and Σlsll = σ. Theorem 2 can be proved by plugging in the suitable values of µ
from the above equations in Lemma 4, assuming ` ≤ 2n−2.
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8 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we revisited some difficulties in designing a PMAC variant that has length-
independent security bound O(q2/2n) up to ` < 2n/2. Particularly, we took a closer look
at a recent PMAC variant by Naito [Nai19] that claims to have length-independent security
bound. We showed that the security proof of this construction has a non-trivial gap which
is not easy to fix. Indeed, we pose it as an open problem to prove or disprove the `-free
security bound of O(q2/2n) for Naito’s construction. Apparently, this problem could be as
hard as a similar problem posed in context of PMAC1 [Rog04]. On a positive note, we show
that 2AXU (see section 5) masking function is sufficient to achieve length-independent
security up to ` < 2n/2. This is a relaxation from the 4-wise independence condition used
in [GPR16]. Finally, we proposed a simple variant of PMAC1, called PMAC2, that achieves
`-free security up to ` ≤ 2n/4. For the range 2n/4 < ` ≤ 2n−2, PMAC2 still achieves `-free
security while σ < 22n/3.
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